SUMMARY
OF THE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE CAPACITY OF AND INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN CABO VERDE

October 27th, 2019
Summary of the Emergency Preparedness and Response capacity and investment opportunities in Cabo Verde

This summary contains the results of a Diagnostic of the Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) system of Cabo Verde based on the Ready2Respond framework. The summary also covers the advised investment priorities.

The assessment took place between mid-May and end of June 2019. The overall conclusion is that the EP&R system in Cabo Verde shows weaknesses that leaves the country vulnerable for loss and damage to her development gains and potential loss of lives. Multiple aspects of the EP&R system should be strengthened simultaneously in order to prepare the country to better respond to crisis and disaster.

1. Introduction: background, methodology and general findings

The World Bank supports the Government of Cabo Verde in a wide range of activities. With the understanding that any impact from natural extreme events is a prevailing risk to development progress up to date, or could possibly undermine the potential for future growth, the World Bank Group supports the archipelago in strengthening procedures and capacities for the management of disaster risks. In continuation of efforts to strengthen the EP&R of the island state, the World Bank decided to carry out an in-depth Diagnostic in order to assess the current status of the system, potential gaps and to identify pathways to build its capacities. The methodology builds on five core interrelated components of emergency preparedness and response:

1. Legal and Institutional Frameworks;
2. Information;
3. Facilities;
4. Equipment; and
5. Personnel.

Each component was measured by a set of criteria that addresses a particular aspect of a functional EP&R system. In addition to each criterion, indicators were added to score a given criteria. Under the five components. The Diagnostic counts in total 18 criteria, 72 indicators and 360 attributes.

1 The assessment was carried out by Prepared International under the funding of LuxDev and directly through the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) Multi-Donor Trust Fund.


The Investment report is titled: Investment and procurement plan for the strengthening of the emergency and response capacities of Cabo Verde. October 2019.

The infographic below shows the Diagnostic results for Cabo Verde for all 18 criteria, as included in the Ready2Respond framework.

The Diagnostic scores for the EP&R system are on the lower side of the spectrum, confirming the initial assumptions by the World Bank and the Government of Cabo Verde that urgent investments are needed in order to strengthen the overall EP&R capacity of the country. The Cabo Verdean EP&R context results in comparatively low scoring within the different Diagnostic Components, as the relatively young system is assessed as rather immature on the scales of the R2R Diagnostic oriented by highly matured EP&R systems from different national realities. The criteria in which the highest scores were reached are “legislated accountability” (0.91) and “Urban firefighting and technical rescue” (0.90). Two components score as low as zero, meaning that these capacities are completely absent in the EP&R system: “Information management systems” and “International support coordination”.

**Purpose of the Diagnostic:** To provide technical support to the Government of Cabo Verde in assessing and identifying systemic opportunities to develop and improve the overall EP&R system.

**Objectives:**
1. To advise on future programs and investments to enhance Cabo Verde’s EP&R system; and
2. To contribute to improving efficiency, avoiding duplication of efforts and enhancing the benefits of collaboration among key government, emergency relief entities, private sector and civil society groups.

Key observations explaining the scores are the following:

- **In general**
  
  The EP&R system currently relies on the good will and motivation of emergency responders and local communities to effectively respond to crisis situations. A comprehensive and strategic system is not in place, which would enable more effective and efficient response capacities. A first challenge is the absence of a common, country-wide interpretation of the main risks for the country resulting in a lack of focus on preparedness and response capacities;

- **Legislation**
  
  Developments to strengthen the basic law has been observed, but legislative frameworks would need further amendments. Initiatives to develop policy plans and procedures, such as Emergency Operational Procedures, Crisis Management Plans and municipality-level Disaster Management Plans should be finalized and endorsed as soon as possible.

- **Information**
  
  Whereas some good elements could be observed in terms of information, the component suffers from the absence of permanent and strategically integrated information and early warning systems;

- **Facilities**
  
  Basic facilities like an Emergency Operations Center, warehouses and shelters are underdeveloped, despite references in legal documents;

- **Equipment**
  
  There are no norms and legislation in place regarding emergency vehicle- and equipment needs. Equipment for firefighting and pre-hospital care is mostly old, un-standardized and not interoperable, partly unreliable and overall insufficient in terms of quantity. As a result, the safety of the general population, visitors and emergency responders can not be sufficiently guaranteed. The National Police however is relatively well equipped;

- **Personnel**
  
  With the exception of the police, personnel capacity is insufficient in terms of quantity and quality. Firefighting capacity is below a bare minimum and knowledge to handle hazardous materials, extraction of persons, and specialized search and (rope) rescue skills are absent on many islands. Several emergency response services operate on merely 50% of the needed capacity, resulting in challenges to perform primary tasks and leaving no margin for the development of the organization and the overall EP&R system.

This Diagnostic report brings to the attention that some relevant findings for the Cabo Verdean context fell outside of the Diagnostic methodology. This context includes the risks of earthquakes and volcanic eruptions on the islands of Fogo, Brava and Santo Antão, as well as possible incidents with oil tankers and cargo ships at sea. Some of the additional findings include:
• A plan for (mass) evacuation to protect inhabitants as well as visiting tourists on the islands of Fogo, Brava and Santo Antão is not in place;
• Legislation and capacity for building code inspections are insufficient; and
• Aside from some arrangements of oil and gas distributors, there is no capacity to respond to incidents at sea and to mitigate any resulting environmental impact.

2. Specific findings for each of the components

Component 1 - Legal and Institutional Accountabilities

The basic legal framework for emergency preparedness and response is in place, and important efforts have been made during the past years. However, further amendments and improvements are needed in order to strengthen the legal framework. Governmental authorities are mostly aware of these required adaptations, and many articles of the legislation already mention further operational procedures and policy plans to be established and/or implemented as extensions of the law.

This incomplete policy structure of operational plans and procedures has important consequences because as a result of it being incomplete, regulations declaring respective accountability are not enforced. As a result, the existing legal framework provides little guidance for organizations to efficiently focus on their responsibilities, hindering the development of key actors who are part of a multi-sector and multidisciplinary collective of crisis prevention, and of management institutions.

The Diagnostic examined governmental and institutional relations and found that the lines of authority between national and municipal levels are not properly balanced in respect with EP&R, and that they lack structure and clear accountabilities. Currently, municipalities hold all decision-making power for investments in EP&R, and this makes the functionality of EP&R at the municipal level subject to political willingness. Furthermore, key positions such as the role of the Regional Commander, are not sufficiently anchored in legislation or defined by law.

In terms of financial preparedness, Cabo Verde has little appropriate financial instruments for EP&R and early recovery, though there is a budget for response that can be made available once a state of emergency is declared at the national level. As a matter of fact, a state of calamity has been declared twice in Cabo Verdean history: in response to the volcanic eruption on Fogo island in 2015 and to the flooding in 2016. Despite official establishment of the National Emergency Fund (FNE) by law on the national level in November 2018, it has not been made operational yet. As such, the financial responsibilities for incident and disaster response are a subject for confusion between the national and municipality level. In fact, the municipalities assume that the national budget will be made available for calamities since no respective budget lines are foreseen in the municipal budgets. Finally, there are no emergency procurement procedures for response.
Component 2 - Information

Non-governmental organizations like the Red Cross and community-based initiatives, are well established and are rooted within Cabo Verden communities. These organizations show a significant potential for public engagement, since the cohesive communities demonstrate a high level of spontaneous resilience driven by individual initiatives during and after recent calamities. However, community engagement to build resilience to disasters on Cabo Verde consists of multiple efforts and lacks an overall strategic and programmatic approach. The incorporation of civil society, its strong institutional memory and close contact with the communities it serves would increase the ownership of the communities in the field of EP&R, facilitate inter-agency coordination and cooperation, and incorporate inter-generational memory in EP&R planning.

Although there is no all-hazard integrated early warning system in place, important components for such a system are operational. Insufficient information-sharing is hampering a collective development of early warning systems. The required capacity for shared analyses is very limited. With the current practice of issuing warnings via cell phone, there is little control over the timely delivery of warnings. The cell phone system is vulnerable during disasters due to a lack of an adequate back-up communication system.

With regards to Disaster Information Management Systems (DMIS), data and information are currently not systematically shared. This is the result of a lack of knowledge of the supportive role that a shared DMIS can play. Secondly, most organizations would not have sufficient structural capacity to contribute to an information system. The Spatial Data Infrastructure of Cabo Verde managed by the Land Management Institute INGT shows much potential but is not widely used to inform decision-making for disaster risk management.

Component 3 - Facilities

At the national level, a shared call and dispatch center for fire brigades, ambulances and police was established in the National Civil Protection building. The outcomes of this initiative are, however, limited, since the center is not sufficiently connected to an overall plan to strengthen emergency coordination and capacity building at national, island and municipality levels.

The assessment identified a general necessity for training facilities to accommodate trainings and exercises in the field of EP&R, which are vital in order to train for enhanced institutional coordination in disaster response and to maintain the basic technical skills of first responders. Lines of command cannot be practiced through exercises and in the absence of the activation of the mechanism for real emergencies, this leads to a lack of awareness and operationality among actors. In most countries, training programs in disaster risk management are rooted in Human Resource Management and connected to multi-agency organizational capacity development. In Cabo Verde, this practice should also be implemented.

Logistical warehouses and response stations play a critical role in disaster response, but such a network of strategically located and supplied warehouses is not in place. Currently, the country depends fully on the logistical capacities of the Red Cross and international support in case of crises. The network of warehouses of the Red Cross is of great added value. Fogo
and Brava have the most articulated requests for warehouse facilities and should be given first consideration in constructing such facilities.

There are no pre-identified open spaces such as parks, vacant land or green spaces that are designated as temporary shelter for displaced people in case of an emergency. In the event of crisis, shelters are improvised in schools or community centers, but these spaces lack the facilities to provide basic living conditions and to guarantee the safety and wellbeing of the displaced persons, especially of vulnerable groups. Equally, there are no protection plans in place to ensure these improvised shelters follow internationally defined guidelines and standards.

Component 4 - Equipment

Emergency social services were identified to be weak in Cabo Verde. There is no functioning system for pre-hospital medical care in place with clear responsibilities and institutional accountability. Overall, the healthcare system operates at a basic level and is challenged by a lack of resources, equipment and qualified personnel. The necessary equipment for pre-medical healthcare in ambulances is mostly not in place, and when it is, it does not comply with international standards. Many ambulances are mainly used as a means of transportation to a medical center or hospital. But even then, injured persons often need to rely on private transportation or taxis and the help of untrained individuals. At the time of the assessment, the island of Brava did not have even one operational ambulance. In case of an emergency with multiple persons injured, the existing medical services would immediately fall short.

Hazard-specific response equipment capacities were located with regards to wildfire emergency management, the response to extreme weather events and for the evacuation in case of seismic activity. However, hazard-specific response equipment is not sufficiently in place for possible volcanic activity, pandemics and flooding landslides.

Fire departments are minimally equipped with mostly old and used vehicles of different brands in various conditions. The supply of sufficient water for responding to larger fire incidents relies on the assistance of private companies to operate water trucks, but their availability is not guaranteed due to the absences of any formal agreements in this regard. Safety equipment to protect firefighters is limited and mostly old. The availability of equipment for search and (specialized) rescue is far below minimum standards and equipment to handle hazardous materials is not available.

The capacity of response personnel to attend to urban fires, as well as to carry out technical rescues is limited due to the lack of specified knowledge and equipment. The growth in the tourism sector opens larger concerns, such as what are Cabo Verde’s capacities to respond appropriately to potential accidents of hiking tourism through rope rescue.

Component 5 - Personnel

The current incident organization structures of Cabo Verde do not allow for an efficient and scalable response to emergencies. The organizational structure defined by law is not implemented and lines of responsibility and communication between actors remain unclear with no shared perspective on a structure for incident organization. As such, incident
response is deployed based on implicit procedures that have been developed in practice over time. No formal evaluation of response to incidents exists and the EP&R system is not organized in a way that enables systemic learning and improvement of itself or its personnel.

The assessment has found that a tradition of trainings and simulations that enhance institutional coordination between key actors was lacking. The training system and knowledge-building of Cabo Verde is limited due to a lack of resources and of skilled technical staff to facilitate trainings. As a result, training is done ad-hoc and mostly on a basic level. For example, experienced (but uncertified) fireman will train younger incoming fire-fighters. Medical first responders are also mainly trained by Portuguese fire departments for basic first aid. Exercises and drills are also carried out on an ad-hoc basis and most take place under pressure of international regulations for airports, marine security and private sector entities, like oil and gas importers and providers. Where emergency response plans are in place, their operational values are estimated to be low, since no simulation exercises are carried out to practice lines of responsibility and command. There are no hazard-specific response plans.

The international support coordination carried out by Cabo Verdean civil protection actors in past emergencies was functional. Nevertheless, international support coordination is hampered by a lack of capacity and clarity on responsibilities in terms of legislation. There are no functional logistical systems in place to receive and distribute international support. In general, many first response organizations are operating below the required number of personnel and many organizations have no statutes formalizing their capacity requirements.

3. Critical and conditional factors for development

Many aspects of the EP&R system need improvements. To support development the following factors and conditions should be taken into consideration:

- With the current lack of capacity combined with a lack of clear structure, even a small ambition for change is a major undertaking that takes a long time to implement. Structural funding for significant capacity building on policy and coordination level as well as for the primary processes should be secured in the government budget.
- An ambitious hands-on longer-term technical assistance program is essential. Technical assistance should focus on project implementation as much as on local capacity-building via an all-stakeholder-inclusive development and project implementation.
- High level political ownership should lead the development of the EP&R system.

4. Investment and development recommendations

The investment opportunities to strengthen the EP&R system are arranged to create two separate tracks of development that to some extent can be implemented independently and at their own respective pace:

- Initiatives to strengthen the foundation of the EP&R system to support development and maturing over time.
- Investments and initiatives to directly strengthen response capabilities on the short to middle term.
4.1 DEVELOPMENT TRACK ONE: INVESTMENTS TO SUPPORT MATURING THE EP&R SYSTEM

Project 1: Emergency Operations Centre and Crisis Management Plan

Investment is critical in order to address the most central caveats in Cabo Verde’s current EP&R system, best support a successful onset of the Emergency Operations Centre operation and ensure the Crisis Management Plan is implemented successfully with clear focus put on sustaining efficiency and clarity for stakeholders holding roles and responsibilities in Cabo Verde’s EP&R.

On the short term $108,800 - is required to hire support to assist SNPCB to:
- Establish operational procedures in support of the Emergency Operations Centre.
- Draft a broadly supported Crisis Management Plan.
- Build knowledge capacity amongst stakeholders in relation to Emergency Operations Centre.

On the middle long term (1-2 years) $550,000 - is required for IT:
- For IT system integration in support of the Emergency Operations Centre and for the development of the geographical information in general a MoU between INGT and SNPCB Should be established including hardware and Populating databases.

Project 2: Support in Full Implementation of EP&R Legislation

Address the identified need for the existent basis of legislation to be implemented at national- and municipal-level, including policy plans and operational procedures that are mentioned in the law and to create clarity on the budget for the EP&R system.

An estimated $222,750 - is required to:
- Support an all relevant stakeholder inclusive process of revision and/or the drafting of the complete legal and institutional framework including the policies and operational procedures mentioned in the Law.
- Establish Municipal Civil Protection Services and emergency response plans.
- Establish Statutes on the responsibilities of Regional Operation Commanders.
- Revise legislation and procedures for the selection of firefighters and other first response personnel.
- Revise mechanism for financial preparedness;
- Advise on centralization of the procurement processes to cut costs and support standardization.
- Establish public financial management policies and procedures.
- Strengthen the legislation for building code inspection and inspection.
- Advise on a training program with table top exercises to support newly adopted Operational Procedures and standards on all islands.
Project 3: Capacity Building in Host Nation Support

Capacitate EP&R stakeholders in their preparedness to provide host nation support, such as evacuation planning and warehouse and logistical hubs. Include international cooperation and support to contain environmental impact as a possible result of incidents with ships at sea.

An estimated $129,300- is required to:

- Draft an operation plan for mass evacuation for specifically Fogo, Brava and Santo Antão and in general for other islands.
- Draft an operation plan for logistical hubs and the coordination of international assistance in response to and recovery from disaster at to be identified locations close to or at harbours and airports.
- Draft a Host Nation Support\(^4\) approach that fully ties into the Operation Procedures and legislation established during project 2.
- The working method should be an all stakeholder inclusive process with a training and capacity building mindset. Strengthened local knowledge is a deliverable of the project.
- Advise on opportunities for cooperation with regional initiatives like ECOWAS, Lusophone countries, the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre.

Project 4: Building Training Facilities

The maintenance and development of technical skills of EP&R personnel has been assessed as limited due to a lack in training facilities. The establishment of a basic 40 persons classroom for training purposes inside of the building of the Civil Protection in Praia will be a vital basis to further develop necessary training capacities.

An estimated $46,000 - is required to:

- With this relatively small investment in the existing SNPCB building creates the flexibility to host trainings.
- Many trainings should be organized at location on the different islands. Having trainings on the different islands reduces transportation costs and first responders in training can still be deployed on the islands in case of an incident or crisis. Training facilities on the other eight inhabited islands should be organized in existing (private) buildings. MoUs with the companies or the owners of buildings should be established.

4.1.1 Required Government commitment to the development of track one: Investments to support maturing the EP&R system

1) It is advised that under leadership of the prime minister - or a designated minister - assisted by the National Civil Protection, buy in and support is secured amongst local political leaders and the management and personnel of response agencies for the EP&R

\(^4\) Host Nation Support includes preparing for: Incoming international aid, Humanitarian relief in case international assistance is requested; Emergency support functions in close cooperation with International Organizations
development programs. Regular progress reporting should assist in keeping all relevant staff and political leadership up to date of developments. The regional commanders of the National Civil Protection could be instrumental in keeping all involved connected and informed. It is advised to draft a communication and cooperation plan in support of the development programs;

2) While implementing the full legislative system, the capacity of policy and coordination personnel should grow to take on new tasks of information sharing and analyses. During the implementation of project 1 and 2, additional capacity needs will become more defined, but a significant increase in personnel budget should be anticipated.
   a. It is recommended to grow the capacity of the SNPCB in the coming year with a minimum of 5 persons that will actively contribute to link with other organizations in the EP&R system.
   b. It is recommended to further grow SNPCB within the coming 5 years with 8 more persons to strengthen capacity and outreach to all inhabited islands of the Archipelago.

3) Strengthen operational coordination capacity of different organization in the EP&R system to the best of financial capabilities on island level based on the advice to be delivered as an outcome of Project 2. Grow capacity with a focus on GIS and general geographic information including Early warning system integration and information exchange;

4) The Government is advised to structurally finance the implementation of adequate equipment maintenance programs. Cooperation with experts from for instance Portugal could be considered;

5) Since budgets are limited, it is advised that shelters in the coming ten years will be considered in existing buildings that require minimal adjustment to be safe and accessible to temporary house persons including vulnerable groups. Government is advised to identify suitable buildings and arrangements for future use as temporary shelter should be put in place; and

6) It is advised that training facilities (classrooms) on the short-term are to be considered in existing buildings at the different islands. Arrangements for use of suitable existing training facilities should be put in place.

4.2 DEVELOPMENT TRACK TWO: INVESTMENTS TO SUPPORT RESPONSE CAPACITY ON THE SHORT- TO MID-TERM

Project 5: Procurement of pre-hospital medical equipment and vehicles

The clear requirements in equipment for pre-hospital medical care were identified by the R2R Rapid Diagnostic as critical investment necessity and should be addressed with highest priority.

Short term: It is advised to grow the availability of ambulances within 1 year with 2 ambulances for each municipality, under the condition that sufficient staff is trained and or
additionally hired. **Total investment in vehicles would be 44 * 135.000 = USD 5.940.000** - Existing ambulances should be listed and the expected remaining life expectancy should be determined. With assistance of preferably Portuguese Civil Protection an adequate maintenance program should be established and budget for. Reservations are made in the budget of government in order to replace vehicles and equipment at the end of its life span.

**Mid-term:** It is advised to replace the ambulances that need to be replaced in the coming 3 years. The inventory should help guide and plan for these investments. Purchase and install 75 fixed radios and equip all ambulance teams with 1 mobile radio.

**Longer term:** Within 7 years purchase all advised medical equipment and vehicles to operate in line with international standards.

### Project 6: Procurement firefighting and rescue equipment and vehicles

The clear requirements in equipment for fire-fighting and rescue were identified by the R2R Rapid Diagnostic as critical investment necessity and should be addressed with highest priority.

- 12 heavy fire trucks: USD 3.000.000  
- 15 Medium Fire Trucks: USD 2.700.000  
- 17 Water Trucks: USD 3.400.000  
- 6 Hydraulic platforms: USD 3.000.000  
- 10 Mobile command units: USD 850.000  
- 450 sets safety equipment: USD 625.500  
- **Total investment: USD 14.325.500**

**Short term:** It is advised to grow the availability of firefighting trucks within 1 year with 9 heavy and 9 medium trucks, under the condition that sufficient staff is trained and or additionally hired. **Total investment in vehicles would be USD 2.250.000 - in heavy - and USD 1.620.000 - in medium trucks.**

Existing vehicles should be listed, and the expected remaining life expectancy should be determined. With assistance of preferably Portuguese Civil Protection an adequate maintenance program should be established and budget for. Reservations are made in the budget of government in order to replace vehicles and equipment at the end of its life span.

**Mid-term:** within 3 years purchase 17 water trucks and 450 sets of safety equipment. **Total investment would be: USD 4.025.500.**

**Longer term:** Within 7 years purchase all remaining equipment. **Total investment would be up to USD 6.430.000.**

### Project 7: Establishment of Preparedness for First Response Training Program

The R2R Rapid Diagnostic identified the urgent need to support and target emergency response personnel in the development of technical skills, with special attention to medical and firefighting. The training program will follow a two-track design, tailored to audience of participants.
An estimated $188,200 is required to:

- Implement a standard basic training for medical and firefighting personnel in all 22 municipalities on nine islands, both volunteers and professionals. Use this first training opportunity to refresh and streamline knowledge and skills and to assess current skill levels;
- Based on the outcome of the first deliverable, design a training program and calculate the costs to reach the international standards response capacity of all first responders prioritizing medical and firefighting teams; and
- Design a program and estimate the costs to train a selection of local professionals to become certified trainers.

Project 8: Establishment of Community Resilience Building Program

Investing in actors from the civil society with the aim of capacitating them in the field of EP&R will tap on their strong community outreach and proximity to vulnerable groups, coordinating their efforts to best facilitate their active involvement in mobilizing communities when faced by a disaster.

An estimated $104,500 is required to:

- Set up municipal-level Community Resilience Support Group under guidance of volunteer Community Resilience Officers that oversees facilitation of simulation exercises and disaster risk awareness campaigns;
- The plan includes specific attention to the needs of all vulnerable groups;
- Draft a multi NGO implementation proposal to build community resilience; and
- Guide and facilitate the implementation process for 3 years.

It is advised to reserve $250,000 for community resilience building initiatives by NGOs on all 9 islands.

4.2.1 Required Government commitment to support capacity building of the system on the short- to mid-term

1. Government is advised to budget the costs for structural training programming including exercises of first responders and coordinators. A yearly budget of USD 500,000 is advised.

2. Many volunteer firefighters do not get leave from their regular jobs to attend trainings. For this problem a solution should be found by hiring professional staff and/or by putting arrangements in place to compensate employers when their personnel is called upon.

3. Volunteering is an alternative to professional firefighters. The capacity of medical and professional firefighting response personnel should be brought to minimal standards urgently. A structural higher personnel budget for operational level is a prerequisite to save lives and protect damage as well as loss of structures. Under the equipment component, the acquisition of additional vehicles is advices. Well-trained professional ambulance and firefighting teams, that are available 24 hours every day of the week, should be considered a precondition before the acquisition of vehicles:

   - An ambulance requires a 2 person staff in 3 shifts. The workload is normally spread over a roster of 6 * 6. It requires 36 trained staff members to operate 1 ambulance 24/7.
   - A fire truck requires a team of 6 responders in 3 shifts. Normally one team of 6 is on standby at the fire department for 24 hours, followed by 48 hours off. One fire truck requires 18 trained staff members to operate 24/7.
In case of limited availability of funding, the following is a focused EP&R development program with a budget of five million dollars. This targeted program derives from the priorities as laid out in the first chapters of this investment report and is intended to use the data collected in this assessment to inform targeted interventions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project number</th>
<th>Project name and output</th>
<th>Investment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>project 1</td>
<td>National Emergency Operations Center and the implementation of Crisis Management Plans: consultancy and ICT infrastructure</td>
<td>US$ 658.800,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>project 2</td>
<td>Competition of legal framework</td>
<td>US$ 222.750,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>project 3</td>
<td>Evacuation planning and warehouse and logistical hubs in the context of Host Nation Support</td>
<td>US$ 129.300,00</td>
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<tr>
<td>project 4</td>
<td>Procurement of 10 ambulances</td>
<td>US$ 1.350.000,00</td>
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<tr>
<td>project 5</td>
<td>Procurement of 11 medium firetrucks</td>
<td>US$ 1.980.000,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>project 6</td>
<td>First response training program</td>
<td>US$ 188.200,00</td>
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<tr>
<td>project 7</td>
<td>Community resilience building</td>
<td>US$ 354.500,00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td></td>
<td>US$ 4.883.550,00</td>
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</table>

The establishment of a Centre of Excellence for Disaster Management and Disaster Risk Reduction should be considered. It is still missing in the West African Region and would provide for the three key points that the further development of the EP&R system of Cabo Verde is in need: Political support, capacity building and long-term funding support.